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The main purpose of this paper is to discuss some fundamental changes that 
occur in human cognition whenever a traditional knowledge management pro-
cess is infl uenced by a new communication technology. Certain fi ndings of ex-
perimental psychology and psycho-sociology makes it plausible to believe that 
the way in which information is processed or visualized infl uences both human 
cognition and human behaviour. Respectively, a comparative analysis of knowl-
edge management strategies intrinsic for particular modes of communication 
will be conducted. On this foundation, I will discuss the importance of communi-
cation technology for the development of particular human capacities and prac-
tices. Finally, some examples will be presented to show the relevance of these 
fi ndings for law. In particular, it will be examined how and why different modes 
of communication may determine the standards and evaluations both of legal 
knowledge and legal practice. However, taking into account the aim of the paper, 
the following argument will focus exclusively on those psychological aspects of 
knowledge management which could explain the impact of communication tech-
nology on the evolution of legal practices.
For the purpose of our analysis let me defi ne knowledge management as 
a set of practices used to develop or acquire expertise and skills or to discover, 
categorize, elaborate and disseminate information about particular data. Such 
practices necessarily involve complex cognitive processes of the human mind, in 
which accessible signs are associated with each other and used in order to learn, 
1  M.E. Katsh, Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law, Oxford University Press, 
New York, Oxford 1989, p. 5.
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communicate, make inferences or associations, draw conclusions or to make 
decisions. Respectively, knowledge management, as defi ned here, is inherently 
connected with those forms of psychical processes, which are determined by sym-
bolic representations. A concrete meaning is assigned to a particular sign in 
a more or less conscious manner only in the course of information processing in 
a human mind. From this perspective, cognition is not a mental state, but a dy-
namic process during which knowledge is managed and elaborated. Therefore, 
cognition is dependent not only on the amount of information but also on the 
speed of its transmission and on both mental and physical mechanisms deter-
mining its selections, choice and availability. If so defi ned, cognition becomes im-
manently directed at and bound with both knowledge as a thing and knowledge 
as a fl ow.2 In other words, it becomes associated with and dependent on what 
and how it refers to. 
If cognition is defi ned as above, then it is determined not only by the natural 
perception and mental abilities of the individual but also by realities and pro-
cesses, which constitutes the object of refl ection. As a result, cognition and knowl-
edge management become mutually dependant and both are determined by the 
method in which the phenomena are communicated and perceived. Therefore, 
they are conditioned not only by the physical ability to experience something, 
but also by the practice of making it meaningful in the context of pre-existing 
notions, images or emotions, which already tacitly or explicitly function in the 
mind. By the practice I mean a meaningful activity, or a set of meaningful ac-
tivities, which build on knowledge, skills and competences, performed by human 
agents individually or in a group. Respectively, if practice means doing, acting or 
performing habitually, then it activates knowledge management processes and 
the development of skills. Consequently, practice implies the development of in-
dividuals who by practicing acquire certain competences. For a lawyer it means 
that the way we draft the law, the method how we interpret it and the manner 
in which we practice are both immanently linked with the problem of the mode 
of communication and knowledge management strategies employed in it. They 
infl uence – directly or indirectly – our perception of legal material and formal 
standards of its quality, reliability and value. 
From the knowledge management perspective, producing and interpreting 
information can be a practice too. However, it is the case only if we talk about 
a particular activity of the body and the mind, which depends on knowledge, 
skills or competence, and which strives for excellence, or at least aims to meet 
certain pre-existing criteria of their quality. Thus, even if production and inter-
pretation of law as such do not need to be necessarily a practice, they become one 
when an attempt is made to fi x, categorize and cognize certain reality according 
to a priori established criteria, i.e. criteria implied by a legal epistemology. In 
conclusion, the practice of legal interpretation depends on cognitive processes, 
which in turn are determined by knowledge management strategies employed 
in legal communication. As argued above, knowledge management shall not be 
reduced exclusively to the cautious procedure of processing explicit information 
2  See D. Snowden, Complex Acts of Knowing – Paradox and Descriptive Self Awareness, 
“Journal of Knowledge Management” 2002, vol. 6 (2), pp. 100–111.
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transmitted in communication processes. Therefore, legal interpretation (and 
legal drafting too) shall be seen as a technology dependent practice. That is, 
a practice whose standards are determined by a internal rationality and a capac-
ity of a technology used to manage legally relevant information.
I can infer that my interest focuses less on cognition or practice as such, but 
rather on the question of whether a usage of different communication technolo-
gies may trigger special cognitive processes and strategies of knowledge man-
agement in legal practices. The relevance of this problem stems from the fact 
that since late 1980’s legal practice has become more and more dependent on IT. 
The recognition of the usefulness of IT in the modernization of the administra-
tion of justice and legal services has brought on multiple changes in the form of 
legal practices. It is clearly visible when one compares the preparation or the 
elaboration of legal documents supported by word processing software, text re-
trieval engines and use of on-line electronic databases with traditional practices 
of legal drafting. Moreover, electronic media have not only enabled much more 
detailed and accurate record of legal discourses, but also changed the traditional 
contexts of their production. For example: we are now able to use on-line legal 
services, which has transformed the traditional directness of the lawyer–client 
relationship.
IT not only enables different modes of knowledge representation and the intro-
duction of information processing technology but it extends the biological capaci-
ties of human agent. They provide growing analytical power and facilitate the 
processing of the complexity of a system of legal provisions. Contrary to speech, 
writing or print, IT is almost immune to the information overload so distracting 
for human perception of information and therefore its use redirects the focus of 
cognitive processes. Human agents can concentrate more on analyzing, revising 
and expanding legal information and less on issues concerning its transmission, 
storage and future accessibility. It suggests that a shift from handwriting and 
printing to IT may result in an important change in cognitive processes related 
with evaluation and choice of legally relevant information. Eventually IT not 
only requires a particular structuring of information but can also itself produce 
information surplus. This can alter the organization of information fl ow and con-
tent of legal provisions characteristic for hand written or printed documents. 
Moreover, it can challenge the traditional reliability and usefulness of print for 
promulgating law. For example, the emergence of writing enabled positive law to 
control the process of social change and to keep a link with the past. Especially 
after the emergence of print, writing helped law to promote stability which was 
considered to be a condition sine qua non of legal certainty and predictability. 
However, IT is able to promise both of them without the necessary stability and, 
therefore, urge law to adjust to current social needs.3 
Information growth makes the problem of its accessibility and selection more 
relevant. When there is too much information it is not any more the lack of infor-
mation that is problematic, but the choice of information from the available set. 
Information overload fosters the selectivity of our choices. Eventually it results 
3 R. Susskind, The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information Technology, Cla-
redon, Oxford 1996.
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in the reduction of the original complexity of reality and supports specialization. 
Writing, print, and particularly IT provide different solutions for this problem. 
Consequently, they make the human practices dependent on different process-
es of structuring or researching information and pre-selection mechanisms. In 
this way, the inherent capacities of different channels of communication may 
infl uence the management of legal knowledge and therefore determine human 
judgments concerning the certainty, trustworthiness and correctness of his/her 
choices and decisions. After all, modern legal practice depends upon our capac-
ity to compare and to verify our interpretations. Without knowing how to record 
information in a way which enables durable and easy access to it, an attempt to 
provide a logical and persuasive proof seems to be impossible, or at least very 
diffi cult. 
Speech, writing, print, and IT offer not only alternative ways of process-
ing information but they also involve different senses or the same in different 
ways. Therefore, they promote different strategies in knowledge management. 
Consequently, they establish different theoretical, practical, and esthetical cri-
teria respectfully of rationality, correctness and appropriateness of communica-
tion. Experimental studies provide us with substantial evidence, which shows 
that communication technologies infl uence not only how texts are produced but 
also how they are interpreted.4 Thus, even though each medium is a means used 
to communicate a message, different media will do it in a different way. They 
will employ different means to encode information, i.e. images, sound, letters or 
a combination of all or some of them. Therefore, different communication tech-
nologies set different conditions for both: cognitive processes and human prac-
tices, and they imply different standards and requirements of their quality. The 
degree to which they are satisfi ed infl uences effectiveness of communication, and 
consequently they impact on human behaviour. Thus the medium shapes, in 
an imperceptible way, individual thoughts, attitudes, preferences, expectations 
and evaluations.5 They can infl uence not only how we communicate something 
but also how we perceive and how we judge what we actually do. Therefore, the 
analysis of their differences will help us later to understand how they shape the 
form and the content of our practices and legal practices in particular. On this 
basis it will be possible to explain how and why modern practices of managing 
legal information, the practice of drafting and interpreting legal documents, de-
pend on the communication technology. 
4  See A.J. Happ, and S.L. Stanners, Effect of Hypertext Cue Presentation on Knowledge 
Representation [in:] “Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting” 1991, 
pp. 305–309; F. Calisir, Z. Gurel, Infl uence of Text Structure and Prior Knowledge of the Learner 
on Reading Comprehension, Browsing and Perceived Contro, “Computers in Human Behavior” 
2003, vol. 19 (2), pp. 135–145; M.F. Mohageg, The Infl uence of Hypertext Linking Structures 
on the Effi ciency of Information Retrieval, “Human Factors” 1992, vol. 34 (3), pp. 351–367; 
T. de Jong, A. van der Hulst, The Effects of Graphical Overviews on Knowledge Acquisition in 
Hypertext, “Journal of Computer Assisted Learning” 2002, vol. 18, pp. 219–231; S. McDonald, 
R.J. Stevenson, Effects of Text Structure and Prior Knowledge of the Learner on Navigation in 
Hypertext, “Human Factors” 1998, vol. 40, pp. 18–28.
5  Olson claims even that the emergence of writing conditioned the distinction between data 
and interpretation D.R. Olson, The Cognitive Consequences of Literacy, “Canadian Psychology” 
1986, vol. 27 (2), p. 120.
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Technology, knowledge management and cognition 
From the psychological perspective different communication technologies 
are not fully interchangeable means of communication. They can determine the 
number and the type of available data and infl uence their perception, retention 
and comprehension.6 They accumulate different amounts of information, they 
transmit it at different speeds and to different locations, and they provide differ-
ent capacities for its accurate and fast reproduction, revision and modifi cation.7 
Respectively, they can not only determine the evaluation of data’s quality but 
also determine the individual level of need for cognition.8 Thus, if one commu-
nication technology replaces another, the effect of such an action cannot remain 
neutral either to our cognition or to the processes in which we manage informa-
tion. Empirical evidence shows that the appearance of handwriting, print or IT 
has each time caused a fl ow of essential changes in individual capacities and 
the enforced modifi cation of human practices.9 Different modes of communica-
tion imply after all not only different mechanisms of information transfer, but 
also different ways in which it is created, elaborated, stored, interpreted, ana-
lyzed and administrated. For example, speech warrants the fast transmission 
of the original text, but its scope is limited and locally bound to the place of its 
production. Handwriting, though, makes possible the transfer the information 
to receivers from any place, limits however signifi cantly the transmission rate. 
More importantly, the quality of handmade copies rarely inspires the confi dence 
of receivers. In this regard, electronic media established a completely new set of 
standards. They created brand-new conditions for transformation, multiplica-
tion and text correction. Moreover, since they have made audio-visual transmis-
sion possible, they may infl uence the practices of message production and the 
reason why the message can be persuasive. 
From the point of view of knowledge transmission, it is crucial to notice that 
different media make different assumptions about communication process. It 
is obvious that television or print presupposes one-way communication, while 
6  From the legal perspective it is important to notice that text comprehension is a multi-
layered cognitive activity that occurs in the context of limited-capacity working memory See 
J.-F. Rouet, J.J. Levonen, A. Dillon, R.J. Spiro, An Introduction to Hypertext and Cognition 
[in:] J.-F. Rouet, J.J. Levonen, A. Dillon, R.J. Spiro (eds.), Hypertext and Cognition, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Mahwah NJ 1996, p. 5; M.J. Wenger, D.G. Payne, Comprehension 
and Retention of Nonlinear Text: Considerations of Working Memory and Material-Appropriate 
Processing, “The American Journal of Psychology” 1996, vol. 109, no. 1, pp. 93 ff.
7  E. Katsh, op.cit., pp. 21 ff.
8  See more J.T. Cacioppo, R.E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, “Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology” 1982, vol. 42 (1), pp. 116–131.
9  For more see: J. Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organisation of Society, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1986; J. Goody, The Interface Between the Written and Oral, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1987; R. Chartier, Forms and Meanings: Text, Performance, 
and Audience from Codex to Computer, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1995; 
M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, MA. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
1979; E. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Cambridge University Press, 
New York 1979; M. McLuhan, Understanding Media, McGraw-Hill, New York 1979.
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speech, telephony, or speech recognition systems imply an interactivity of com-
munication and presuppose its immediacy though not always its directness. It 
shows that some communication technologies make it possible to separate infor-
mation from the time and context in which the original message was produced, 
while others are unable to do so. This has substantial consequences both for 
how we perceive the information and how we manage and evaluate the acquired 
knowledge. Hence, while some media will strengthen the human potential to 
aggregate knowledge in a durable and controllable way, others will not, for ex-
ample the relation between communication technology and the management of 
knowledge in linguistic practices. 
It is a commonly shared belief that the very distinction between langue and 
parole has been made possible thanks to writing. Without writing it would not 
only be technically diffi cult to disconnect language from concrete and individual 
utterances, but it would also be diffi cult to imagine a practical possibility and 
a theoretical need for such a distinction. Writing makes it possible not only to 
formalize but also to describe the language. Furthermore, it conditions the ap-
pearance and functioning of several formal categories and abstract notions. For 
example, since it enables us to differentiate between the actual meaning of the 
utterance, and the possible meaning of its formal representation, it determines 
the possibility of conceptual distinction between the utterance and the sentence. 
Therefore, writing promotes a stable categorisation of reality, and facilitates its 
critical analysis. In this way it supports the forming and managing of rigid and 
autonomous linguistic practices. It offers also a permanent recording of idiolects, 
enabling the investigation of the systemic nature of vernacular. In this way it 
conditions the creation of institutional standards of language. The availability of 
print contributes to this process substantially since, unlike speech, the produc-
tion of script cannot be easily monitored. The permanent and effi cient control of 
handwriting is far more diffi cult and costly. The process of printing makes the 
external and institutional control of the script quality easy. Moreover, it enables 
editing the text in a way undetectable for readers. Therefore, it can create an il-
lusion of the existence of commonly shared standard of linguistic practices and 
put psychological pressure on text users to adjust their individual practices to 
the institutional standard of language usage. 
Taking all of this into account, one can see that communication technologies 
involve distinctive knowledge management practices both on the level of code 
and of its usage. It shows that communication technology has the potential to 
determine the mechanisms of the institutionalization and standardization of hu-
man practices even on the most basic level. This in turn can contribute to the 
evolution of human capacities and the perception of reality. The abovementioned 
example shows that writing and particularly print are responsible for represent-
ing knowledge as a system of sentences. Consequently, knowledge defi ned as 
a system of sentences, unlike knowledge defi ned as an acquaintance or familiar-
ity gained by sight or experience, could claim its cognitive autonomy. The fi rst 
does not need to be either sponsored by the concrete author or be directed to the 
concrete addressee. Consequently, it urges its own existence supported by the 
physical barrier that makes any external infl uence on its form and content im-
possible. The second excludes most of what was aforementioned. It immanently 
173
implies the presence of those to whom it is addressed and in its essence is always 
“sponsored” by a concrete individual. Consequently, one could expect that the 
evaluation of knowledge in the fi rst sense will depend exclusively on the quality 
of argument yet, in reality, it is not necessarily so. The evaluation of knowledge 
depends on an individual level of need for cognition.10 
Petty and Cacioppo’s experiment indicates that there are two different routes 
through which a message can be evaluated: the central and the peripheral. While 
the fi rst requires careful consideration of the arguments quality, the second does 
not demand critical processing. Consequently, contrary to the peripheral route, 
the central route expects from the receiver involvement and competence. The 
Petty and Cacioppo’s research shows that when people lack motivation or skills 
they tend to engage in an easier and more superfi cial processing of information. 
In this case they are less sensitive to the argument’s quality and are much more 
responsive for peripheral cues like, i.e. attractiveness of presentation or credibil-
ity of the speaker. If it is the case that the mode of communication can infl uence 
the evaluation of knowledge, especially because they do not enjoy the same level 
of reliability, as well as the accuracy and effectiveness of knowledge transmis-
sion. In oral communities in particular the amount of information is limited by 
the effi ciency of human memory supported by mnemonic techniques. Writing 
offers unlimited possibilities of data accumulation, and as such, makes it pos-
sible to refer to them in the future.11 Therefore, writing enables the expansion of 
knowledge beyond the local needs that determine existence of particular group 
and enhances the analytic nature of thinking.12 Consequently, abstract notions, 
concepts and conceptions can come into being and obtain their own, permanent 
and autonomous existence. 
However, the potential of handwriting to enrich knowledge is limited. 
Although it enables systematic observation and reliable comparative studies, it 
is slow, diffi cult to copy and does not provide easy access to recorded informa-
tion. Therefore, it was the invention of print that increased the speed of social 
evolution. Furthermore, while print merely facilitated scientifi c progress, elec-
tronic media support the full realization of the analytical potential of the hu-
man mind. They make it possible to use different kinds of tools and methods of 
analysis. IT in particular not only accelerates the process of long text production, 
but also eases their interpretation by taking into account their full complexity.13 
Moreover, it communicates new fi ndings to a wider audience more effi ciently and 
overcomes the speed limits imposed on text production by writing or print. IT 
enables transmission in an entirely reliable manner (at least it is so believed) of 
10  See J.T. Cacioppo, R.E. Petty, op.cit., pp. 116–131; J.T. Cacioppo, R.E. Petty, K. Morris, 
Effects of Need for Cognition on Message Evaluation, Recall and Persuasion, “Journal of Perso-
nality and Social Psychology” 1983, vol. 45 (4), pp. 805–818.
11  J. Goody, I. Watt, The Consequences of Literacy [in:] J. Goody (ed.), Literacy in Traditional 
Societies, Cambridge University Press, New York 1968; J. Goody, The Interface Between the 
Written and Oral, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.
12  A.R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, M. Cole (ed.), 
M. Lopez-Morillas and L. Solotaroff (trans.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 
London 1976, pp. 102 ff.
13  More: R. Susskind, op.cit., pp. 107 ff.
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not only text or pictures but also the whole audio-visual context of the communi-
cation. It may infl uence both the perception and evaluation of a message. On this 
basis one can claim that the social and psychological signifi cance of knowledge, 
its acquisition and transmission, depends directly on methods of storage, elabo-
ration and administration of information. 
As we can see, writing fundamentally changes the knowledge management 
typical for oral communication. The reason for this is the mnemonic and pho-
netic character of the later. Writing is graphic and therefore capable of consol-
idating knowledge beyond human mind. In this way it changes the status of 
knowledge characteristic for oral communication, and impels different cognitive 
processes.14 It employs not only different senses but also changes the object of 
communication. What in the context of the conversation is individual, particu-
lar and concrete, in writing inevitably enters the realm of the offi cial language 
of written records. Unlike speech, written text carries all possible information 
contained in the universe of the institutional language. As a result, on the se-
mantic level, written text transmits much more information than one may have 
intended, while on the pragmatic level it communicates much less than what 
may have happened. What in speech is implicit yet still univocal, writing must 
be expressed explicitly. It is one of the reasons why communication mediated 
in writing focuses primarily on semantics and syntax. Otherwise, what in the 
context of conversation carries a concrete and undisputable meaning, in writing 
may embrace other meanings and sense, often contradictory with the original. 
Therefore, writing pursues the formalization of the communication and tends to 
separate it from extra-linguistic elements, which often condition the effi ciency of 
speech. For example, while a silent spell in a conversation may be signifi cant, it 
is not so in the case of writing. Even though there are some graphical forms used 
to express silence, they are nonetheless unable to carry out the performative ef-
fect they may have in oral communication. Writing deprives the act of speech of 
its illocutionary force. It stems not only from the fact that a transcript does not 
take into account many non-verbal elements present in face to face communica-
tion, but also from the fact that it is not backed up by any concrete reality, which 
constitutes a presupposed common framework of speech. This process goes even 
further when information is managed with IT. IT alters and reconfi gures the 
reality described by language. They remove its original context and replace it 
with a virtual reality, which in the best-case scenario constitutes only a second-
ary and non-neutral interpretation of the former. In that way cognition becomes 
gradually separated from the substance of the world and reality. That, in turn, 
affects the semantic and syntactic stability of the language.15 
Also, text analysis indicates important changes in knowledge management 
practices involved in text production when different modes of communication 
are employed. Some of them are psychologically signifi cant. For example, as op-
posed to the written text, which is a fi nished product fi xed on a carrier, a con-
crete oral utterance has a dynamic and fl eeting nature. While speech is out of 
14  J.B. Gleason, N.B. Ratner (eds.), Psycholingwistyka, Warszawa 2005, pp. 447 ff.
15  M. Poster, The Mode of Information and Postmodernity [in:] D. Crowley, D. Mitchell (eds.), 
Communication Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995, p. 176.
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necessity connected locally with the context of its production, the handwritten 
and printed texts, thanks to their autoglotic character, become a component of 
the cultural universe. They are detached from external reality and in its own 
structure appear to be independent and fully verbalized. Therefore, written texts 
can claim at least some autonomy while speech cannot. The latter is always con-
nected with a specifi c situation, relations between participants, circumstances 
of its production and its function.16 An oral utterance is produced here and now 
between concrete subjects. Individual utterances are relatively short and the 
whole text of communication is immanently open and often has neither a well-
marked beginning nor an end. Taking advantage of the technical possibilities of 
the graphical record, written texts usually assume a continuous, uninterrupted, 
and unrestrained form. Consequently, the spontaneity and unpredictability of 
a conversation can be replaced by well-ordered content and a linear or hierarchi-
cal structure. Traditional written texts are physically closed. They have, at least 
formally, a noticeable beginning and an end, which in turn allow their synchron-
ic conceptualization and analysis. However, it may not be the case of a written 
text which is mediated by electronic media, especially where linear structures 
of a handwritten or a printed text are replaced by multidimensionality and non-
linear form of the Hypertext. From our perspective it is crucial to notice that 
Dee Lucas and Larkin’s tests proves the relation between the text format and 
knowledge management.17 Similarly Wenger’s and Payne’s experiment indicates 
that while written text presupposed a linearity of thinking, hypertexts support 
nonlinear and associative thinking.18 These results are confi rmed by De Jong’s 
and van der Hulst’s experiment, which shows the infl uence of the interface on 
the exploration route that readers follow in a hypertext system and on the mem-
orization of facts.19 In consequence, one can assert that an electronic form of 
a text introduces not only a range of new ways of managing the textual infor-
mation, but also employs different cognitive mechanisms of human mind. From 
the knowledge management point of view the most important change that the 
hypertext format brings about is that it undermines the traditional distinction 
between the author and the reader.20 Therefore, it revolutionises the traditional 
concept of text and assumptions about the way it should be written and read.21 
Another signifi cant change that takes place in the cognitive aspect of knowl-
edge management results from the fact that different communication technolo-
gies introduce and promote different types of interpersonal relationships. These 
types directly or indirectly bring to the cognitive processes different assump-
tions about interaction between individuals. For example, recorded information 
doesn’t presuppose either the necessary presence of the reader in the process 
16  A. Wilkoń, Spójność i struktura tekstu, Universitas, Kraków 2002, pp. 36 ff.
17  D. Dee-Lucas, J.H. Larkin, Text Representation with Traditional Text and Hypertext, 
Technical Report 21. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 1992.
18  M.J. Wenger, D.G. Payne, op.cit., pp. 93 ff.
19  T. de Jong, A. van der Hulst, op.cit., pp. 228 ff.
20  N.G. Patterson, Hypertext and the Changing Roles of Readers, “The English Journal” 
2000, vol. 90, no. 2, Technology and the English Class, November, pp. 76 ff.
21  J.M. Slatin, Reading Hypertext: Order and Coherence in a New Medium, “College English” 
1990, vol. 52, December, p. 877; N.G. Patterson, op.cit., p. 76.
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of its production or the necessary presence of its author in the process of its 
transmission and reception.22 Consequently, they replace one-on-one, concrete 
and direct interactions, so characteristic in a conversation, with indirect, imper-
sonal or non-direct communication. It is because neither does the author need 
to see and know his readers nor do the readers need to see and know the writer. 
Print depersonalizes communication even further because it replaces individual 
handwriting with standardized letters. While handwriting personalizes the text 
in many respects,23 print ultimately breaks the physical link between the text 
and the author. The next critical change in the relationship between the partici-
pants in the discourse results from the introduction of the electronic audio-visual 
media. By replacing the author with the sender, and readers with the audience, 
they break the original links between the author, the message and the reader. 
A sender no longer needs to be the author and, therefore, an audience becomes 
rather an object of his management than the addressee of the author’s message.24 
Unlike speech, recorded communication requires a conceptualization of the re-
ceiver as the construct of the sender. Both the Internet and telephony have by-
passed this problem to some degree. Although they allow interactive communi-
cation, they detach it from the common context of conversation. Telephony and 
electronic media of communication make communication possible regardless of 
the distance between the participants. However, they are still unable to provide 
the interlocutors with the direct physical access which is implied in speech. The 
lack of physical contact and the common context put communication in formal 
frames of one-way-transmission. It makes our interlocutors unreal and enhances 
the construction of their image in our mind. However, it is only IT that can sub-
stitute a real person with a virtual image and, therefore, differences between 
face to face communication and IT communication go far beyond the dislocation 
of interlocutors. IT not only allows the receiver to evaluate calmly the contents 
of the message without the fi rst-hand supervision and control on the part of the 
sender. It also interacts with human personality and releases individuals from 
psychological restrains, which usually control their behaviours in face to face in-
teractions.25 Communication on the Internet results in the diminution of the im-
portance of physical appearance, greater anonymity and provides interlocutors 
with greater control over the time and pace of interactions. Moreover, it helps to 
fi nd similar others.26 In consequence, it creates an illusion of homogenization of 
22  Por. B.S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law, Deborah Charles Publications, Liverpool 1995, 
pp. 83 ff.
23  See A. Lüke, Grafologie für Einsteiger, Ariston Verlag, Genf 1983.
24  D. McQuail, Mass Communication Theory. An Introduction, SAGE Publications, London 
et al. 1988, pp. 218 ff. Cf. J. Ellis, Channel 4: Working Notes, “Screen” 1983, vol. 24 (6), p. 49; 
R. Silverstone, From Audience to Consumers: The Household and the Consumption of Communi-
cation and Information Technologies [in:] J. Hay, L. Grossberg, E. Wartella (eds.), The Audience 
and its Landscape, Westview Press, Colorado, Oxford 1996, pp. 283 ff.
25  Y. Amichai-Hamburger, Personality, Individual Differences and Internet Use [in:] A.N. 
Joinson, K. McKenna, T. Postmes (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Internet Psychology, Oxford 
University Press, New York 2007, pp. 188 ff.
26  See more: ibidem, p. 187.
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the society while in reality cause its fragmentation and diversifi cation.27 It chal-
lenges the traditional mechanisms of knowledge transmission and devalues the 
established practices of learning.
Summing up, communication technology infl uences the cognitive aspect in 
knowledge management practices. Taking the above into account one can argue 
that scepticism and a critical attitude appear not so much as inborn character-
istics of the human mind, but rather as a result of permanent accessibility to 
the systematic record of information. Respectively, human cognition and com-
municative practices depend as much on human biological attributes as on the 
capacity of the medium to manage information. 
Legal practice and knowledge management technology
The infl uence that communication technology has brought to bear on law and 
the administration of justice is multidimensional, but not fully recognized by le-
gal thinkers. Therefore, the issue does not fi t into the mainstream considerations 
of legal theory and the philosophy of law. One can even claim that the practice of 
law is immune to the developments of technology and it is the role of law makers 
to adjust it to the changing reality. However, considering that communication 
technologies change human perceptions of time and space,28 restructure the real-
ity to which law refers, and provide lawyers with different means of its interpre-
tation and communication, I will argue that they inevitably alter both the way 
lawyers conceptualize law and how they make and apply it. Respectively, the 
following argument constitutes an attempt to show that communication tech-
nologies may determine the legal conceptual apparatus, and that their impact 
on human cognition forces the practice of law to adjust and stay in line with the 
standards of knowledge management they impose. On this basis some basic legal 
concepts and practices are examined in order to show that different modes of 
communication, through their infl uence on human cognition, may determine the 
evolution of legal institutions. 
Immanent characteristics of each communication technology induce gradual 
and inevitable evolution of the legal discourse. They alter the law subtly and 
slowly; therefore, the change is often imperceptible or unquestioned yet they con-
dition the whole of legal practice. Law – whatever it is – must be communicated. 
This requirement makes law dependent on communication technologies, which 
determine a series of inherent requirements the law must comply with in order 
to be able to play its social function. In practice it results in many differences in 
legal discourses carried out by different media. In a word, the communication 
technology and IT available conditions not only the practice but also the theory 
of law. 
27  E. Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law, Oxford University Press, 
New York, Oxford 1989, p. 105.
28  On the impact of the concept of space on law see D.R. Johnson, D. Post, Law and Borders: 
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, “Stanford Law Review” 1996, vol. 48, no. 5, May, pp. 1369 ff.
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Legal anthropology clearly indicates that the invention of writing initiated 
a series of conceptual changes in law. Writing increases the tendency of human 
intellect for the abstract and generalization and, therefore, determines not only 
the form, but also the content of legal rules. In illiterate societies rules have to 
be memorized and, therefore, they take the form of proverbs or formulas that 
ease the process. The art of writing made possible a formal and critical drafting 
of provisions. Spontaneous changes, so characteristic of laws of illiterate societ-
ies, become restrained. In oral societies they usually result from imperceptible 
processes where a legal practice adjusts spontaneously to the changes, which 
occur in the reality of a given community. In such a context, practices which lead 
to an anomaly tend to be forgotten and removed or adjusted to the new situation 
without the necessity to launch any special formal procedures. In a system of 
written and printed laws the situation is quite opposite. A legislative decision 
must be taken to remove, or to change the practice based on ineffective or inad-
equate regulations. 
The way in which the practices are communicated changes not only the man-
agement of legal knowledge but may alter the human perception of its norma-
tive and authoritative status. For example, the oral transmission of customs 
makes them unrefl ective and open to spontaneous change. Its validity and reli-
ability depends on the prestige of leaders. In contrary, written laws are based 
on reasoned principles and doctrines and its validity depends on the formal pro-
cedure of knowledge transmission. Therefore, without a written record, a sharp 
distinction between ius and lex or customs and customary laws is hardly pos-
sible. An analogical change in the status of legal knowledge takes place when 
handwritten legal records are replaced by printed documents. The reason for 
this is a limited access to the former,29 and the low credibility of their copies. 
Therefore, it was only the invention of print, which could overcome the origi-
nal distrust toward handwritten legal texts and enhanced the process of their 
codifi cation.30 Paradoxically, nowadays when IT enables the fast production and 
reproduction of texts, handwritten texts have in certain contexts a higher reli-
ability than printed or electronic documents. With the expertise of modern gra-
phology, a handwritten text can disclose implicit information about its author, 
his character and mood, which printed or electronic versions are not able to do. 
Moreover, it is much more diffi cult to falsify a hand written document. These 
are one of the reasons why in many contemporary legal systems testaments are 
handwritten and printed or electronic forms are not accepted. However, taking 
into account the qualities of audiovisual record, it is possible that testaments in 
this form will in near future join handwritten ones.
When a new communication technology enters into the legal practice it grad-
ually and inevitably transforms the management and the perception of its object. 
It does not necessarily replace old institutions and sentiments bound by pre-
existing modes of communication, but it supplements them or re-adjusts their 
functions to the new conditions and setup. Therefore, the psychological need for 
29  Originally handwritten statutes were often promulgated orally.
30  See more D. Pietruch-Reizes, Rozwój środków przekazu informacji o prawie, Śląski In-
stytut Naukowy, Katowice 1992, pp. 157 ff.
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certainty and truth, which in primordial societies was expressed in special magi-
cal rituals connected with the administration of justice, has not disappeared in 
literate societies, but underwent formalization and secularization. For example, 
in the Middle Ages, even in societies where written texts already had a predomi-
nant status, procedures existed which required their confi rmation by witnesses, 
oaths or ordeals. For a long time, testimonies provided decisive evidence simply 
due to their certain status, and questionable credibility of scripts. Even though 
a written text could constitute an important source of evidence, it did not have 
a conclusive character.31 A feeling of distrust towards a script underlies the ap-
pearance of the concept of a document, i.e. the authentic and certain text. A text 
can only become a document if it possesses all of the formal qualities required 
by law. It provided a reason for development of material and procedural rules 
which regulated the authenticity of documents. Practice has shown that until 
those rules were introduced, the legality of written records could always be chal-
lenged.32 
It has already been indicated that the graphic record disconnects the text 
from the context of its production, especially from its author. When separated 
from the subject and recorded, a text can become an autonomous object of critical 
interpretation. Respectively, written records can stand for an objective and even 
exclusive point of reference in the evaluation of their content. Therefore, when-
ever a rule is fi xed or recorded, cognition focuses on its semantic and syntactic 
aspects. Moreover, its structure and content becomes subjected to the formal re-
quirements of a written format, and the conditions of its explicitness, unambigu-
ousness and comprehensibility. After all, a written text cannot answer questions 
if a controversy arises with respect to its meaning. It is why writing imposes not 
only specifi c requirements with respect to its language and structure on a legal 
act but also with respect to its interpretations. In consequence, a written record 
conditions a need for the emergence of professional legislators and interpreters. 
However, when prepared by specialists, legal texts become fully intelligible only 
to those who possess special skills. The practice of written law requires on the 
part of an individual literacy and ability to think in categories implied by the 
system of abstract rules. It is so, because until laws were written down, rules 
could exist only in the human memory. Writing frees our mind from the need 
to remember laws, but forces us to develop new mental abilities that make the 
management of a growing set of general rules possible. Moreover, because it 
provides a possibility to accumulate a virtually unlimited number of rules, it 
makes legal practice sensitive to the problems of legal infl ation and of cognitive 
overload. 
When a rule is written down and fi xed in a form of a legal provision, it becomes 
its own entity, and therefore a separate object of cognition. This process enables 
a separation of the written body of law from social practices. Consequently, law 
can be conceptualized as an instrument of adjudicating cases, and less a practice 
31  See W. Daves, People and Places in Disputes in Ninth-century Britain [in:] W. Davies, 
P. Fouracre (eds.), The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1986, p. 75.
32  See R.C. Van Caenegem, Legal History: A European Perspective, The Hambledon Press, 
London, Rio Grande 1991, p. 80. 
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of solving problems. In this way writing contributes to the depersonalization of 
law and to the infl exibility of legal sanctions.33 Legal language becomes a distinc-
tive register of a language and legal epistemology begins to operate in terms, and 
within the borders, of statutory regulations. It results in further professionaliza-
tion of legal practices. Accordingly, the topical and problem-oriented character 
of legal thinking is being replaced by the formal requirements of deductive rea-
soning. 
The emergence of writing and print make the self-referential character of 
law and legal discourse possible, though it is only IT that can make law truly 
an autopoietic system.34 The possibility to fi x and to visualize rules formalizes 
and institutionalizes the management of legal information. On the psychologi-
cal level, it conditions the emergence of general and abstract legal concepts and, 
therefore, suppresses particularity and originality of thinking. In this way script 
and print also support the legalistic attitude of legal practitioners. This pro-
cess becomes fully observable especially when legal documents get printed. The 
growing availability of statutory regulation and courthouse records opened the 
practical possibility to refer to them and to take them as an exclusionary reason 
in legal decision-making. The unrestrained availability of authentic legal texts 
made it possible to support verdicts with formal rules. On the one hand it could 
have had a therapeutic effect, because it released judges from the moral and 
social responsibility for their decisions. On the other hand law and legal practice 
could claim objectivity and certainty inaccessible before the era of print.
In our days, legal discourse is gradually opening up to knowledge manage-
ment systems bound to electronic means of communication. As in case of hand-
writing and print before, they also alter nowadays the way in which legal docu-
ments are drafted, and how legal services are provided. However now, for the 
fi rst time, legal knowledge and human cognitive processes are determined and 
structured actively though interactions with electronic legal databases. In this 
way legal practice has become more dependent on the logic of information tech-
nology and on specialists’ knowledge from outside the legal domain. Moreover, 
new technologies, like mobile telephony or the Internet have changed clients’ 
expectations and consequently forced legal practitioners to adjust to new pos-
sibilities and to change the traditional form of legal services. This has resulted 
in the development of legal practices, which like the already mentioned on-line 
legal services are heavily dependent on the standards imposed by IT. 
The change in psychological processes triggered by different communication 
technology also impacts on the human understanding of notions functioning in 
the legal discourse. In particular, differences in the form and the content are 
visible when comparing oral contracts and/or testaments with written and/or 
with electronic ones. Although both institutions are known in illiterate societies, 
33  N. Rouland, Legal Anthropology, Ph.G. Planel (trans.), Stanford University Press, Stan-
ford 1994, p. 170.
34  H. Maturana, F. Varela, Autopiesis and Cognition, Reidel, Bostot/Dordrecht 1980, pp. 89 
ff.; N. Luhman, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems [in:] F. Geyer and J. van der Zouwen (eds.), 
Sociocybernetic Paradoxes. Observation, Control and Evalutaion of Self-steering Systems, Sage, 
London 1986, p. 174; G. Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology 
of Law, “Law and Society Review” 1989, vol. 23 (5), pp. 727–757. 
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it was the introduction of writing that externalized the elements of contracts 
and wills, which in the oral tradition operated as hidden presuppositions. The 
graphical form gave a legal statement a stable, externally cognizable foundation. 
Records enable parties to appeal or to refer to the text of the statement, when-
ever necessary. In this way the semantic meaning of the text of a contract or 
a will become conclusive and can determine the range of possible and admissible 
interpretations. Respectively, the handwritten form not only broadens the scope 
and range of elements which characterizes these institutions in oral societies, 
but also practically enables their diversifi cation and increases the degree of their 
complexity. 
There are different types of contracts found in illiterate cultures. However, 
their nature, forms and functions depend on the memory and longevity of eye-
witnesses. These biological limitations are often recognized by parties of the 
contract themselves. The impossibility to record the contract narrows down the 
variety and the complexity of contracts and induces specifi c forms and customs 
whose aim is to limit the disadvantages of human memory. Furthermore, in 
oral cultures, the role of speech goes beyond the role of carrying the message. 
Speech in oral communities often carries a much more important mystical or 
affective charge, which in turn results in particular rituals and practices.35 The 
handwritten form makes these practices obsolete and focuses attention on the 
content of a contract. As a result, contracts began to contain detailed clarifi ca-
tions, explanations or defi nitions, which were missing in the oral tradition. In 
this way script altered the whole practice of making contracts and established 
very different standards with respect to its form and content. Even on the sym-
bolic level, an act of signing the agreement replaced other symbolic forms char-
acteristic for illiterate cultures, like the adjudication or the handing over a sod of 
earth. Electronic media have brought about an analogous change. For example, 
contracts mediated by an electronic medium often lack the negotiation stage 
and a formal signing. The whole process of making an agreement is limited to 
a “click,” which implies acceptance of the provisions of the contract as proposed 
by the seller.36 Respectively, agreements become remote from human agents and 
it is the software that controls its proper execution, i.e. it limits the possibility 
of an unlimited copying of a program, or its illegal or harmful use. This implies 
not only a change in the agreement form, but also the need to alter the contract 
concept. New contracts create not only a bunch of obligations and duties of the 
contractors, but “physically” enforce their own execution in line with their own 
provisions. 
The strong infl uence of communication technologies is also visible in other 
legal institutions. For example, drafting the testators’ will in writing enables 
a series of different types of testaments. Moreover, it is not only more diffi cult 
to challenge the handwritten will before the court, but the written form makes 
it possible to achieve the precision of the will otherwise unattainable. Writing 
and especially printing brought fundamental changes also to the management 
35  See more N. Rouland, op.cit., pp. 140 ff.
36  See Z. Bańkowski, B. Schafer, Double-Click Justice: Legalism in the Computer Age, “Le-
gisprudence” 2007, vol. 1 (1), p. 48.
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of the litigation process, and confl ict resolution.37 A written record, if reliable 
and accessible, not only formalizes the entire decision-making process, but also 
makes it easy to decide about relevance of certain pieces of evidence. An ob-
jective and formalized examination of a witness’ testimony is unquestionably 
a lot more diffi cult than in the case of written documents. Testimonies of wit-
nesses are not only often inconsistent with each other, but are also vulnerable 
to a process of emotional formation.38 The written record makes possible the 
creation of evidence which exists independently from the memory of individuals. 
Consequently, accessibility of reliable written documents does not only restrict 
the area of possible disputes, but also changes the overtones in probative pro-
ceedings. A further improvement in this respect is offered by audiovisual media, 
which provides a judge with “direct” access to the event under examination. The 
intrinsic credibility of an audio-visual transmission allows the new multimedia 
form of evidence to enter the courtrooms much easier than was the case with 
hand written texts. This is no longer the result of the low credibility of the script 
but the capacity of electronic media to transmit sound and the vision. They pro-
vide the judge with more data than written documents and facilitate the decision 
making process. Moreover, electronic multimedia create a practical possibility 
not only to see what really took place, but also provide a rich collection of effi -
cient tools, which enable a detailed analysis of recorded information. 
The more legal proceedings open up to the world of IT, the faster they will 
change the way the law is practiced. For example, if we take into account how 
the modern concepts of appeal or cassation are conditioned by the availability of 
written records, one can expect that audiovisual records will also change both in-
stitutions. The formalization and depersonalization of the legal process resulting 
from the emergence of written records was followed by the bureaucratization of 
the administration of justice. Electronic multimedia are in a position to keep the 
legal process formalized and standardized to the highest degree without making 
it necessarily bureaucratic. Firstly, because unlike written records, they make 
it possible to record the whole trial, including its non-verbal contexts and thus 
in case of an appeal, an audio-visual record will provide the higher court with 
a much more detailed picture of the situation than the written dossier could 
have ever done. Secondly, the computerization of legal proceedings limits the 
possibility of errors and physically force lawyers, or concerned parties, to fol-
low procedures. If they don’t comply, the procedure simply cannot be executed. 
Moreover, electronic technology enables the introduction of intelligent agents 
who can guide the concerned party through the complexity of law. The agent 
immediately provides all related legal data and gives an explanation if required.
Another domain of law which has undergone a massive change resulting from 
the introduction of writing to the legal discourse was property law. The intro-
duction of writing fundamentally changed the legal practices with regard to the 
37  For example a possibility to procure an authentic record of a trial changed the whole idea 
of an appellation. The legal process and judicial decisions become formalized and standardized. 
As a result, a dispute as well as content and form of the judicial process, can be submitted to 
a process of external control and supervision. 
38  A. Memon, A. Vrij, R. Bull, Prawo i psychologia. Wiarygodność zeznań i materiału dowo-
dowego, GWP, Gdańsk 2001, pp. 140 ff.
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administration of real estates. It made it possible to create legal registers in 
which rights or titles relevant to a real estate could be recorded. Consequently, 
a number of legal institutions were created which enabled the effi cient legal 
turnover of real estates. One can mention here public notaries, mortgage laws 
or land securities. Writing caused an analogical change in family law. A formal 
defi nition of marriage and written rules for family law justify the distinction 
between a marriage and other relationships relating to the category of illicit 
cohabitation. A direct consequence of this change created a problem concerning 
the legal status of children born from such relationships. Nowadays electronic 
means of communication also put pressure on family law, however, in this case 
it is so because they have changed the concept of cohabitation and traditional 
sexual practices.39 
Conclusion 
Of course there are many more examples which are able to illustrate the 
impact of knowledge management mechanisms used by different communica-
tion technologies on human cognition and human behaviour. However, the ones 
discussed above already show that different media induce different cognitive 
processes and therefore offer different potential to create a space for the devel-
opment of legal practices. They impose different constraints, requirements and 
standards on legal knowledge representation. They make it possible to detach 
legal practices from the concrete place and time. They can imply the directness 
and locality of legal communication, or they can dislocate legal actors. Some 
of them, like IT, can even create a new, entirely virtual legal reality. Finally, 
different communication technologies implicitly carry a number of different 
supplementary information,40 which may in an imperceptible way infl uence our 
perception and understanding of transmitted data. For lawyers, all this means 
that technology employed to manage legal knowledge should be taken seriously. 
It implies not only very different mechanisms for transmitting legal informa-
tion, but also opens divergent ways of perception and the administration of legal 
knowledge. Lawyers should be aware of the fact that certain communication 
technologies may trigger special mental processes and focus our perception on 
different issues. In this way, directly or indirectly, they may determine the sig-
nifi cance of legal information. Consequently, they may condition not only the 
evolution of legal practices, but often their creation. If this is the case then IT 
will challenge the traditional practices of legal knowledge management and will 
create pressure to adjust them to the new framework.41
39  See more B. Creed , Media Matrix. Sexing the New Reality, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest 
2003, pp. 122 ff.; L. Parisi, Abstract sex: Philosophy, Bio-Technology and the Mutation of Desire, 
Continuum, London 2004, pp. 5 ff.
40  D. Riesman, The Oral Tradition, the Written Word and the Screen Image, Antioch Press, 
Yellow Springs, Ohio 1956, pp. 12 ff.
41  More: D. Rowland, E. Macdonald, Information Technology Law, Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, London, Sydney 1998.
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